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NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
pension or revocation. 52 Not until the driver is afforded such a mean-
ingful opportunity will the essentials of procedural due process ac-
tually be attained.5 3
DANIEL L. HOVLAND
NEGLIGENCE-OCCUPIERS OF LAND-LAND OCCUPIER HAS A DUTY TO
BOTH INVITEES AND LICENSEES TO ACT AS A REASONABLE MAN
Plaintiff, an insurance agent, brought an action for damages suf-
fered when' she was bitten by defendant's dog. Plaintiff had gone
uninvited to defendant's farm to try to sell an insurance policy. De-
fendant was not home at the time. As plaintiff was walking to the
front door, the dog rushed out of the house, chased her back toward
the car, and bit her on the leg.1 The district court concluded that
plaintiff was a bare licensee on the premises and therefore defendant
owed her no duty other than not to harm her willfully or wantonly.
The court found no such wi!lfullness or wantonness by defendant 2 and
dismissed with prejudice plaintiff's complaint. On appeal, the North
Dakota Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court and
held that the status of the person entering the premises is no longer
the sole factor to be used in determining liability and that the oc-
cupier 3 has a duty to act as a reasonable person in maintaining his
property in a reasonably safe condition for both invitees and licen-
sees.4 O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977).
Liability for negligence is generally based upon whether the
52. In both Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) and Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254
(1970), the Court was careful to point out the serious economic hardships of suspension..
In both cases It appears that the Court was cognizant of the relative importance of both
state an1 Individual Interests.
53. The necessity of notice and hearing Is only one of many possible legal Issues that
may arise on appeal from a suspension or revocation, of a driver's license. The reader's
attention Is accordingly called to several annotations concerning the suspension or revo-
cation of a driver's license on various grounds: Annot., 38 A.L.R.3d 452 (1971) (physical
disease or defect) ; Annot., 9 A.L.R.3d 756 (1966) (habitual, persistent, or frequent vio-
lations of traffic laws); Annot., 5 A.L.R.3rd 690 (1966) (accumulation of a sufficient
number of points under a point system) ; Annot., q8 A.L.R.2d 1064 (1963) (refusal to take
an Intoxication test) :Annot., 96 A.L.R.2d 612 (1964), Annot., 87 A.L.R.2d 1019 (1963) and
Annot., 79 A.L.R.2d 866 (1961) (convictions of motor vehicle offenses). The reader's
attention Is also called to an annotation concerning the validity of financial responsibility
laws, Annot., 35 A.L.R.2d 1011 (1954). See also Jennings v. Mahoney, 404 U.S. 25, 26
(1971), where the Court declared that there was plainly a susbstantial question whether the
Utah statutory scheme for the suspension of licenses under a financial responsibility law,
on its face, afforded the procedural due process required by Bell.
1. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 747-48 (N.D. 1977).
2. Id. at 748.
S. In this comment the term "occupier" shall mean occupier, owner, possessor, or
anyone who has control of the premises.
4. 251 N.W.2d at 752.
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actor's conduct was reasonable in view of the circumstances.' Oc-
cupiers of land, however, have been treated differently.6 Their lia-
bility has been based on rights of property owners or occupiers in
a culture which traces many of its standards to a heritage of feudal-
ism. 7 The result was that an occupier's liability was determined
not by the reasonableness of his conduct, but rather by the status of
the entrant on the premises: trespasser, licensee, or invitee.
At common law, an occupier owed no duty to a trespasser
other than to refrain from willfully or wantonly harming him.10
Once the trespasser was discovered, the occupier had to exercise
ordinary care to avoid injuring him.1 '
The next higher category at common law was a licensee,12 who
was distinguishable from a trespasser only by the consent to entry
given by the occupier. The duty on occupier owed a licensee was the
same as that owed a discovered trespasser. 3
The highest standard of care owed an entrant was that owed an
invitee. The occupier was under an affirmative duty to protect the
entrant, not only against dangers of which he knew, but also against
those which he might discover.' 4 There has arisen great difficulty
in deciding who is an invitee.
5. In Heaven v. Pender, 11 Q.B. 503, 509 (1883), the court stated the general rule
as follows:
[If] one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard to
another that every one of ordinary sense who did think would at once recog-
nize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill In his own conduct with
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person
or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to avoid
such danger.
See also W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971).
6. "Occupiers liability" refers only to liability for Injuries sustained as a result of tba
condition of the premises. The duty involved in these cases is to keep the premises rela-
tively safe. For his personal actions, the occupier's liability will be determined by the
usual standard of negligence. See supra note 5.
7. The common law categories of entrants upon land derive from an Initial premise
that the rights of possessors merit special protection. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW Or
TORTS 1432 (1956). Another reason for a different standard of liability is that the plaintiff
has voluntarily, at least In most cases, placed himself within reach of the defendant's
failure to take precautions. Id. at 1430.
8. See generally PROSSER, su7pra note 5, at 357-98.
9. A trespasser is "a person who enters or remains upon land in the possession of
another without a privilege to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise." R,-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965). For a general discussion of trespassers and
modifications of the trespasser rule, see J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY 7 (1976).
10. Reasoner v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co., 251 Iowa 506, 101 N.W.2d 739
(1960) ; Frederick v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 207 Wis. 234, 241 N.W. 363 (1932).
11. Reasoner v. Chicago, Rock Island and Pacific R. Co., 251 Iowa 506, 101 N.W.2d5 739
(1960); Dubs v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 50 N.D. 163, 195 N.W. 157 (1923). At least
one Jurisdiction holds that no duty Is owed even to discovered trespassers, at least where
the peril Is not imminent. Carroll v. Spencer, 204 Md. 387, 104 A.2d 628 (1954).
12. A licensee is a person who enters the premises with the permission or consent of
the occupier or owner for the licensee's own purposes. Reddington v. Beefeaters Tables,
Inc., 72 Wis. 2d 119, - , 240 N.W.2d 363, 366 (1976), modified on other grounds, 72
Wis. 2d 119, 243 N.W.2d 401 (1976).
13. Leach v. Inman, 63 Ga. App. 790, 12 S.E.2d 103 (1940); Wolfson v. Chelist, 284
S.AV.2d 447 (Mo. 1955). In those jurisdictions which have abolished the use of the cate-
gories the Important factual issue In many cases is whether the person is anticipated on
the Premises. See, e.g., Gibo v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 299, 459 P.2d 198
(1969).
14. Graham v. Loper Electric Company, 192 Kan. 558, 389 P.2d 750 (1964) ; Boniwell v.
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To determine who is an invitee, the Restatement of Torts has
adopted the "economic benefit" theory. 5 This theory is based upon
the status of an invitee as a customer or business visitor in a place
of business. 8 The idea is that the store owner would realize a pos-
sible economic benefit from the entrant's presence. The affirmative
duty owed the invitee is part of the price the owner pays for the
possible benefit. 1 7 Courts have been very imaginative in finding the
entrant to be an invitee under this theory.18
An alternate theory, the one used by the majority of the courts,
is based upon the occupier's representation that reasonable care has
been exercised in making the premises safe for those whom he has
encouraged to enter and further a purpose that is to the benefit of
the occupier. 9 The test stresses the "invitation" and whether the
premises are held open to the public.2 0
For many years the three categories of entrants were used in
the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions. 2  Determining liability
by using the category method, rather than looking at the reason-
ableness of the occupier's conduct under all the circumstances, has
Saint Paul Union Stockyards Company, 271 Minn. 233, 135 N.W.2d 499 (1965). The rule
was first established in 1866 in England. Indermaur v. Dames, 1866 L.R. 1 C.P. 274, af-
firmed, 1867 L.R. 2 C.P. 311.
15. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 332, 343 (1934). § 332 states as follows: "A business visitor
is a person who is invited or permitted to enter or remain on land in the possession of
another for a purpose directly or indirectly connected with busiess dealings between them."
Comment b to § 332 states as follows: "[S]hopkeepers as a class regard the presence
of the public for any of these purposes [buying goods, looking at the goods dtisplayed, or even
for the purpose of passing through the store as a shortcut] as tending to increase their
business."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (965) lists a business visitor as one type
of licensee. I
16. Krueger v. North American Creameries, Inc., 75 N.D. 264, 27 N.W.2d 240 (1947).
17. See W. PROSSER, supra note 5, § 61, at 386. Much to the confusion of juries, a social
guest has not been considered an invitee, but rather a licensee, even if he renders incidental
services to the occupier. Wolfson v. Che'ist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955); Hall v. Duke,
513 S.W.2d 776 (Tenn. 1974). See also infra note 35.
18. For example, one case held that a person who entered a bank to get change
for a $100 bill was an invitee because it was reasonable for the plaintiff to be-
lieve that getting change for a large bill is consistent with the intentions and purposes
of bank owners. First National Bank of Birmingham v. Lowrey, 263 Ala. 36, 81 So. 2d
284 (1955). The economic benefit in a case such as this is a mystery. See V. PROSSER, supra
note 5, at 3S7-88. Professor Prosser commented as follows: "While it has been said often
enough that the 'mutuality of interest' may be indirect and remote from the object of the
particular visit, there is at least ground for suspectng that in some of these cases, at least,
it has been dredged up for the occasion." Id. at 388 (footnote omitted).
19. Prosser, Business Visi'tors and Invitees, 26 MINN. L. REV. 753 (1942).
20. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965). Invitation is conduct which justifies
others in believing that the possessor desires them to enter the land. It differs from per-
mission in that permission allows others to believe the possessor is willing that they shall
enter If they so desire.
21. See V. PROSSER, supra note 5, at 357. The first case of its kind in North Dakota was
O'Leary v. Brooks Elevator Co., 7 N.D. 554, 75 N.W. 919 (1898). The court held that no
duty was owed an eleven year old trespassing boy. The defendant knew that children
played at the spot where the boy was injured, and that it was a potentially dangerous
spot. But the court refused to apply the attractive nuisance doctrine because the boy went
to the spot with his uncle and not becatse he was attracted to the thing which injured
him. Id. at 559, 75 N.W. at 920. This holding was followed eighteen years later in Cos-
tello v. Farmer's Bank of Golden Valley, .14 N.D. 131, 157 N.111. 982 (1916).
It is interesting to note that North Dakota law of trespassers, licensees, and In-
vitees began and elided with an O'l'eary.
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been criticized by many as being harsh because the results are often
inequitable and the jury's function is usurped.22 The courts have
tried to modify the harshness by carving out numerous exceptions
to the rules. 23 These exceptions tended to produce confusion and con-
flict. Because of these difficulties, there has been an increasing dis-
satisfaction with the use of the common law categories.
24
The first significant departure from the use of the categories
came in the country of their origin. In 1957, England adopted the Oc-
cupier's Liability Act, 25 which abandoned the licensee and invitee
categories. The occupier in England now owes the same common
duty of care to both licensees and invitees. The reasonableness of
the occupier's acts depends upon the circumnstances of the entry.
26
The Act does not affect the trespasser category nor the duty owed
the trespasser at common law.
In the United States the changes have been made by the courts
and not by the legislative bodies. 27 The United States Supreme Court
made the first significant move and discarded the categories as they
applied to maritime torts by calling their use a "semantic morass. ' 2 8
The leading case for abandoning the categories in all situations
is Rowland v. Christian.29 In Rowland, the California Supreme Court
held that whether the plaintiff is a trespasser, a licensee or an in-
vitee is not determinative of the duty of care owed, but is only one
of the factors to be considered in determining that issue.30 The
court based its holding in part on a California statute.31 Subsequent
22. 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS 1430-1505 (1956) ; 49 N.D.L. REV. 733, 738
(1973) ; 44 N.Y.U.L. REV. 426, 430-31 (1969).
23. The North Dakota Supreme Court gives a "brief listing of some of the exceptions
and distinctions complained of . . . : discovered and undiscovered trespassers; owner and
nonowner cases; nonowners using the premises for their own convenience and nonowners
acting on the owner's behalf; active negligence (i.e. dangerous activities) and passive
negligence (i.e. dangerous conditions) ; dangerous conditions obvious to the owner and
those not obvious to the owner; child trespassers; frequent use of limited area excep-
tions; technical trespassers; social guests: implied licensee; business visitor; and trapped
trespassers." O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.'W.2d 746, 749 (N.D. 1977).
The United States Supreme Court noted that a "[r]andom selection of almost any
modern decision will serve to illustrate the point." Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 n.6 (1959).
24. The Missouri Supreme Court expressed its dissatisfaction in 1955 by saying that
the status of the person entering does not necessarily control under all circumstances.
Wolfson v. Chelist, 284 S.W.2d 447 (Mo. 1955).
25. The Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957 5 & 6 Eliz. 2 c. 31.
26. Id. at § 2(2)-(3).
27. An exception is Connecticut, whose legislature raised the status of a social guest
from licensee to invitee. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-557a (West Supp. 1975). Dilorio v.
Tipaldi, -- Mass. App. Ct.- , 357 N.E.2d 319 (1976), applying Connecticut law. See
also infra note 35. Although limited to social guests, the Connecticut statute removes one
of the most difficult problems of the licensee-invitee distinction. See supra note 17.
28. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959). The
Court found that "[f]or the admiralty law . . . to import such conceptual distinctions
[licensee-inviteel would be foreign to its traditions of simplicity and practicality." Id.
at 631. The court then noted that the categories of entrants originated under a system
with respect to real property, a system "alien to the law of the sea." Id. at 631-32.
29. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968).
30. Id. at - , 70 Cal. Ftptr. at 104, 443 P.2d at 568.
31. Id. at - , 70 Cal. Rptr. at 99-100, 443 P.2d at 563-64. CAL. Cry. CODE § 1714
(West 1973), provides as follows:
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decisions in states without a similar statute indicate, however, that
there are also nonstatutory rationales for the decision.3 2 Currently
eight jurisdictions have followed California in abandoning the com-
mon law categories. 33
Four jurisdictions no longer use the licensee and 'invitee cate-
gories, but do use the special category of trespasser.3 4 Seven others
have raised the status of a social guest from a licensee to an in-
vitee.3 5 Iowa and Kentucky do not use the categories when the en-
trant is a child.3 6 The rest of the states have either not recently
decided a case such as O'Leary, or have retained the common law
categories despite the current trend away from their use.
3
T
The first case to provide the North Dakota Supreme Court with
an opportunity to follow Rowland and abandon the categories was
Werth v. Ashley Realty Company.3 8 The court, however, declined
to follow California's lead, saying that they perceived no great trend
in that direction and dismissed the California court's reasoning by
saying that the categories have been "reasonably useful in the
past., 9
In 1976, in Sendelbach v. Grad4 0 the North Dakota Supreme
Every one Is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also
for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill In
the management of his property or person, except so far as the latter has,
willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the Injury upon himself. The
extent of the liability In such cases is defined by the Title on Compensatory
Relief.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-06 (1975) Is almost Identical.
32. Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969). The
Supreme Court of Hawaii believes that the common law distinctions have no logical
relationship to the exercise of reasonable care for the safety of others.
33. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1972); Webb v. City and Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977);
Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 175 Colo. 537, 489 P.2d 308 (1971) ; Pickard v. City &
County of Honolulu, 51 Raw. 134, 452 P.2d 445 (1969); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Co-
operative, Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976); Oulette v. Blanchard, 116 N.H. 552, 364
A.2d 631 (1976) ; Scurti v. City of New York, 40 N.Y.2d 433, 387 N.Y.S.2d 55, 354 N.E.2d
794 (1976) ; Mariorenzi v. Joseph DiPonte, Inc., 114 R.I. 294, 333 A.2d 127 (1975).
34. Kermarec v. Compagnie General Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959); Mounsey
V. Ellard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973); Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199
N.W.2d 639 (1972) ; Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 70 Wis. 2d 836, 236 N.W.2d 1 (1975).
35. Wood v. Camp, 284 So. 2d 691 (Fla. 1973) ; Hardin v. Harris, 507 S.W.2d 172 (Ky.
1974); Bramble v. Thompson, 264 Md. 518, 287 A.2d 265 (1972); Preston v. Sleziak, 16
Mich. App. 18, 167 N.W.2d 477 (1969); Schelbel v. Hillis, 531 S.W.2d 285 (Mo. 1976);
Memel v. Reimer, 85 Wash. 2d 685, 538 P.2d 517 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §
52-557a (West Supp. 1975).
A social guest, no matter how cordially he was Invited or urged to come, was,
until recently, a licensee In almost all jurisdictions. This was so even If he performed
incidental services while on the host's premises. The reasoning given was that the guest
understands when he comes that he will be treated like one of the family and must take
the premises as the occupier himself uses them and is entitled at most to a warning of
dangers known. Pagliaro v. Pezza, 92 R.I. 110, 167 A.2d 139 (1961).
36. Rosenau v, City of E'therville, - Iowa-- , 199 N.W.2d 125 (1972) Louisville
Trust Co. v. Nutting, 437 SW.2d 484 (Ky. 1968).
37. See, e.g., McMullan v. Butler, -Aa.l- , 346 So. 2d 950 (1977) Disabatino
Bros., Inc. v. Baio, - Del.- , 366 A.2d 508 (1976) ; Gerchberg v. Loney, 1 Kan. 2d 84,
562 P.2d 464 (1977) ;Behrns v. Burke, -S.D.-, 229 N.W.2d 86 (1975).
38. 199 N.W..2d 899 (N.D. 1972). See 49 N.D.L. REv. 733 (1973).
39. 199 N.W.2d at 907.
40. 246 N.W.2d 496 (N.D. 1976). In Sndelbach, the plaintiffs had retired from farming
and had given their chickens to the defendants. In return, the plaintiffs received free eggs
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Court had another opportunity to follow the lead of Rowland. Al-
though the court again failed to adopt the reasoning of Rowland,
Justice Vogel, in a special concurring opinion, advocated abolishment
of the distinctions between licensees and invitees in favor of a rule
that reasonableness of the conduct of occupiers be adopted as the
proper test for determining liability. 41 The court, in retaining the
categories, relied heavily on Werth, but Justice Vogel declared that
"it is now time for Werth to self-destruct. ' 4?
Less than six months later, in O'Leary v. Coenen, North Dakota
joined the other jurisdictions following the lead of Rowland and
abandoned the use of the licensee and invitee categories as being
solely determinative of the duty of care owed such an entrant.4 3
The trespasser category remains. 4
The O'Leary court held that the common law di'stinctions have
no logical relationship to the exercise of reasonable care for the
safety of others, ' 5 that human safety is of greater importance than
a land occupier's unrestricted freedom,4 6 that the common law cat-
egories are often difficult to apply in factual situations, 47 and that
using the categories usually usurps the jury's function and does not
let them apply changing community standards to the duty owed.4
The holding in O'Leary does not make an occupier an insurer
of his property. Rather, the status of an entrant will no longer be
solely determinative on the issue of the duty of care.49 All the factors
of the case may now be integrated into a general theory of the land
occupier's liability.
The circumstances of the entry will remain important. 0 Fore-
seeability will be a major factor. Foreseeability of the entry of
people on the premises will likely differ in a city as compared with
for a time and then occasionally bought some from the defendants. The defendants were
not in the egg selling business. On one occasion the plaintiff was bitten by the defendant's
dog while going out to the chicken coop to get some eggs. It was unclear whether the de-
fendant had consented to the plaintiff going to the coop. The jury found! that the plaintiff
was a licensee and could not recover. Id. at 498. It is interesting to note that in Sendcl-
bach the jury was allowed to determine the plaintiff's status and that it was not decided
as a matter of law as is the usual case.
41. Id. at 502.
42. Id. Two justices concurred with Justice Vogel on the issue of abandoning the cate-
gories; the same two justices who concurred with Justice Vogel also concurred with the
majority opinion. Id.
43. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977).
44. See infra notes 54-55, and text accompanying.
45. 251 N.W.2d at 752. See also Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 134,
452 P.2d 445 (1969).
46. 251 N.W.2d at 752. See also Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97,
443 P.2d 561 (1968).
47. 251 N.W.2d at 752. The court cited Sendelbach as a good example of how definitive
such a determination can be. Id. at 749. See sunra note 40.
48. In O'Leary, the court cited Werth v. Ashley Realty Company, 199 N.W.2d 899 (N.D.
1972), as an example of a case "where a local jury could well have found nossessors of
premises located In or near urban areas which the public fren',ents to be under a higher
standard of care than the possessors of rural property. 251 N.W.2d at 749.
49. Id. at 752.
50. Id.
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a rural area.5 1 For example, even in rural areas, foreseeability of
people being present during the hunting season will most likely dif-
fer from other times of the year. The import of the new rule is
that the jury may now decide these issues and they will not 1:
decided as a matter of law.52
To make the premises safe for the entrant, the occupier r.ust
sacrifice some interest in ownership of his land. 53 Under the O'7 ?ary
rule, the interest which must be sacrificed by the occupier is a
factor having new importance. The interest may be more or less
important, depending upon whether the premises is a store, or a
farm, or a person's home. For example, in both Sendelbach and
O'Leary, the plaintiff was bitten by a dog while on a farm, an ob-
viously important fact to consider in answering the question of
sacrifice, since dogs are useful on farms.
Although an increasing number of jurisdictions have abolished
the licensee-invitee distinction, they have not agreed on whether the
trespasser category should be maintained. Those jurisdictions which
have followed Rowland in abandoning all three categories have held
that they serve no useful function. 54 Other jurisdictions, including
North Dakota, consider the distinction between trespassers and those
who enter with consent so great that the abrogation of the rule as
to trespassers should not be considered. 55
It is reassuring to see that North Dakota has acknowledged the
trend favoring the abandonment of the common law categories, at
least as the sole determinative factor in cases where they arise. The
categories have long since outlived whatever useful function they
were designed for and their demise is welcomed.
MARK W. MORROW
INFANTS-CRIMES-YOUTHS SENTENCED UNDER FEDERAL YOUTH COR-
RECTIONS ACT MAY NOT BE CONFINED IN A CORRECTIONAL INSTITU-
TION WITH ADULT OFFENDERS
In 1975, petitioners were convicted of criminal acts and were
sentenced for treatment and supervision under the Federal Youth
51. Id.
52. Normally the status of the entrant will be an issue decided by the court. Werth v.
Ashley Realty Co., 199 N.W.2d 899 (N.D. 1972). In a case where the evidence is incon-
clusive, however, the jury is instructed as to the distinctions of the status involved and
are allowed to determine the status as a matter of fact. Sendelbach v. Grad, 246 N.W.2d
496 (N.D. 1976).
53. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 752 (N.D. 1977).
54. See supra note 33.
55. Mounsey v. Willard, 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973): O'Leary v. Coenen, 251
N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977) ; Antoniewicz v. Resczynski, 70 WVis. 2d 836, 236 NW.2d 1 (1975).
286
